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Under the impact of spreading direct controls of the evolving mili-
tary economy, the money and banking mechanism was compelled
to relinquish the position it had occupied as the nerve center of the
traditional capitalist economy. The money and capital market char-
acteristic of that economy had all but disappeared long before the
actual outbreak of hostilities, and credit institutions had been shorn
of much of their power. In an article published in January i 938, a
leading Nazi banker with a great deal of political influence candidly
called attention to the change in the position of the banks, and, in-
directly, to some of the other changes. "The banks," he wrote, "can
hardly decide on their own any longer which services to render to the
entire economy. Their opportunities for service depend on the ever-
changing requests which are made of them depending upon the gen-
eral situation in the economy. The more the capital market as well
as the entire economic development are regulated and influenced by
the central government, the more the use of bank credit and the
volume to be used depend upon decisions which the banks Cannot
influence directly."
The material that follows will show that the change in relation-
ship between government and economic institutions that marked
the rest of the Nazi development also characterized the development
in money and banking, and that the accumulation and exercise of
power by the government left the money and banking institutions
with few of their traditional functions and prerogatives.
To the Nazis, preparing for total war, the inherited banking
mechanism was inadequate. Instead of leaving to interest rates and
the deposit-generating decisions of the banking system the deter-
mination of the volume of funds available for short- and long-term
use, the German government saw to it that the Central Bank and
other credit institutions provided whatever funds were considered
necessary. Instead of permitting the market mechanism to set in-
terest rates, the government fixed them in terms of its politico-
military requirements. Instead of depending upon the mechanism
of the market for the allocation of funds, the government used spe-
cial devices to syphon accumulated funds into desired channels.
IFriedrich Reinhart, "Bankgewerbe vor neuen Aufgaben." Bank-Archw (January 1.
1938) pp. 137 if.
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Direct controls made new private investment through the capital
market either completely impossible or subject to government ap-
proval. Credit institutions in the capital market found their status
completely altered. Instead of making important investment deci-
sions, and determining the use to which their funds were to be put.
they merely had to provide the technical facilities for coveringgov-
ernment expenditure or financing new investment, the volume and
composition of which had been previously settled by the govern-
iiient. Institutions in the money market did not fare much better.
There the banks may have retained a little more authority, but the
changes in their prerogatives and limitations upon their authority
were drastic.
In neither the money nor the capital market did interestrates,
anticipated profits or the entrepreneurial judgment of the individ-
ual industrialists and bankers have much to do with investment
decisions. It was the government that determined the volume and
composition of new capital investment and production, that allo-
cated the raw materials and labornecessary for the execution of the
investment and production plans, that became increasinglyre-
sponsible for the quantity and distribution of industrial and agri-
cultural production- and all with an eye to the requirements of
its military program. With sucha government, sufficiently powerful
and willing to determine not only theamount of credit to be made
available to the entire economy atany given time but also the types
of borrowers and terms of credit, the meaning and significanceof
credit control as it was known in thepast underwent a profound
change, a change affecting both its techniques and itsobjectives.
The changes in technique introduced by the Naziswere clearly
designed to make credit controlmore direct and qualitative than
ever before, and thereby more selective and effective. The pre-Nazi
Reichsbank was converted into an institution ableto determine, at
the behest of the government, not only the totalvolume of credit
to be supplied, but also the use to be made of it. Justas radical was
the change in the objectives of credit control.For a long time, credit
control was largely synonymous with creditrestriction. A primary
objective of credit control was the maintenanceof the gold standard,
or, in the case of a country operating on an inconvertiblepaper
standard, the maintenance ofa certain relationship between the
domestic currency and foreign currencies.
a
VGiven these objectives, both standards tied the domestic currency
to other currencies in the international money marketand made
it difficult for monetary authorities to pursue a wholly independent
- credit policy that would lIt the needs of their domestic situation.
The abandonment of the gold standard in 1931, and the subsequent
development of a highly effective system of foreign exchange con
trol, enabled the Nazis, on the one hand, to establish any rela
tionship they might have desired between foreign currencies and
the mark, and on the other hand, to pursue any kind of domestic
credit policy without fear that external forces might upset that
relationship.
The abolition of the so-called automatic link between the Get
man currency and the currencies of the rest ofthe world removec.
a host of real and imaginarybarriers to credit expansion and facili-
tated a change in the objectives of credit policy. This is implicit in
t statements of Dr. Schacht, the President of theReichsbank, and of
I Hitler himself. If anybody in pre-Nazi Germany was acutely con-
scious of a relationship between credit policy and the problem of
e maintaining a stable currency, it was Dr. Schacht. Yet once the Nazis
were in control, Dr. Schacht, whohad constantly warned pre-Nazi
governments against many socially significant measures asendan-
gering the stability of the mark, now publicly called attention to the
1 fact that there were no quantitative limits to credit expansion,limits
e which he had formerly so strongly emphasized. Before the annual
shareholders' meeting of the Reichsbank on March 9, 1934. Schacht,
then its President, announced that "quantity is hardly aproblem in
d making credit available as long as the credit-standing of thedebtor,
that is, his ability to make efficient use of the borrowedfunds, is
y carefully considered."4 An officially authorized text quotes him as
n declaring to an American journalist a few months later that "expan-
ri sion of credit is possible as long as there is certainty that thedebtors
can repay the loans. As long asthis principle is observed, there is no
it limit whatsoever to the increase in credit. Banking policy inGer-
many intends to give credit to everyonewho deserves it."Since the
it chief borrower was the Reich, which Schaclit ostensively felt was
making efficient use of the funds it borrowed, there waspractically
1, no financial limit to the creationof credit.
Hitler's statement, coming three years later when the economy
was a good deal closer to fullemployment, was drafted more care-
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fully. It made clear that the sole yardstick for German credit policy
was the relationship between the volume of credit and the potential
volume of goods and services to be produced. In an address on
December so, 1937,6 Hitler declared: "To save OUT people is not a
financial problem, but merely a problem of how to make use of our
manpower and our natural resources."
Put positively, the objective of credit control under the Nazis
was to provide the financial instruments required to keep the econ-
omy fully employed, by combining manpower and natural resources
n accordance with the government's military plans. From the very
beginning the Nazis realized that their grandiose hopes of military
supremacy would require huge quantities of public credit. Their
credit and banking measures, therefore, were designed to make the
money and capital market as productive of public funds as possible.
Despite a system of direct control over production and investment,
which made it extremely difficult to use any substantial volume of
funds for unapproved purposes, the government took the additional
precaution of giving itself legal authority over all credit institutions.
This not only enabled it to supervise carefully those banking activi-
ties that were still not regulated by the direct controls over the
economy, but also ensured full participation by every institution in
the military plans of the government.
The significance of the entire Nazi control mechanism in banking
can be appreciated only when the totality of their political dictator-
ship and the military objective of their tightly-organizedeconomy
are remembered. Banking legislation was passed when Germany was
preparing for war, and the banking and credit system, likeso many
other parts of the economy, was made an aide-de-camp,a servant of
the military master. The Reichsbank Statutewas changed, a far-
reaching law affecting all other credit institutionswas enacted, and
various other measures were taken, all of which will be discussed in
the following sections. 'The reader will doubtless realize thatsome
of the new regulations and measures introduced by the Nazisre-
semble banking provisions that existed in the UnitedStates and
other countries long before the outbreak ofwar. It will not be amiss
to point out that these similarities are largely ofa formal character.
4 Schacht in semen Aeusserungen, ed. by the Reichsbank (1937)p. 51.
5!bid., pp. 51-52.






As long as there is freedom in internationaleconomic transactions
and the various items in the country's balanceof payments are
cleared through a gold standard system, theCentral Bank is obliged
to provide for an adjustment ofthe excess of incoming over out-
going, or outgoing over incoming, payments,by buying or selling
gold. This means that the Central Bank cannotcompletely dominate
the credit conditions of the nation. A large excessof outgoing pay-
ments may necessitate creditrestriction, a heavy excess of incoming
payments may lead to an undesirableexpansion of credit facilities.
Expansion or contraction of credit resultingfrom the movements
of gold may affect domestic prices andproduction. Changes in the
discount rate of the Central Bank may lead tointernational move-
ments of money and capital that mayalso affect domestic credit con-
ditions.
With the introduction of foreign exchangecontrol in Germany
in 1931, the ties between the German creditmechanism and money
and capital markets abroad were severed,and the government was
able to prevent those maladjustments in thebalance of payments
which, under the gold standard, migilt haveaffected the credit and
price mechanism of the country. Foreign exchangecontrol gave in-
dependence to the Central Bank, without whichthe Nazi govern-
ment could not have attempted to set up a"self-sufficient" banking
system. It meant that excess paymentsfor international transactions
would no longer occur unless the government actuallywanted them.
The power of the government over internationaleconomic affairs
became so great that it could fix the total amountof outgoing pay-
ments at any level it saw fit. itcould prevent the amount of outgo-
ing payments from exceeding the amount ofincoming payments.
Since export trade was not as rigidly controlled asimports, the
amount of incoming payments might haveexceeded the amount of
outgoing payments. The government had no reason tofear such a
development since it had no objection to theaccumulation of for-
eign exchange. It had acquired sufficientcontrol over the internal
credit mechanism to neutralize the effect of anyinflux of gold or
foreign exchange if it so desired.
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Foreign exchange control comprises allmeasures affecting the
collection, administration and utilization of the supply of foreign
exchange and gold which becomes currently available. Itcontains,
in addition, all provisions regulating the trade in foreignexchange,
including the fixing of the price for foreign currencies interms of
the national monetary standard. Itwas introduced in Germany be-
fore the advent of the Nazi regime, in thesummer of 1931, when the
spreading credit crisis in Europe drained largequantities of gold and
foreign exchange out of thecountry.
The subsequent history of this control mechanismis not unlike
the history of regulation in otherparts of the economy. During the
first few years every effortwas made to maintain as much entrepre-
neurial freedom as possible. Visible tradewas supervised and con-
trolled much less strictly thanwere capital movements. Emphasis
was placed upon quantitative controlover the value of imports in
order to avoid interfering with the importer'sfreedom to buy what
and from whom he wishedso long as lie stayed within the quantita-
tive limits set by the foreign exchangeauthorities. This mechanical
system, steadily supplemented byan increased use of individual
investigations and permits,was reconstituted as part of the "New
Plan" in the autumn of1934, when it became increasinglynecessary
to discriminate in favor of essentialcommodities, particularlyraw
materials, at the expense of less essentialgoods. Thereafter, every
individual contemplatinga transaction which involved an outflow
of foreign exchange hadto apply to the proper authorities fora
permit.
Nazi literature emphasizes thatthis change was madenecessary
by an increased shortage offoreign exchange and by theharmful
effect upon German trade ofthe depreciation and devaluationof
currencies abroad. Thismay have been true, but it was scarcelythe
only reason for tightening thesystem of control. Basic changes in
the rest of the economy mademodification of the foreign exchange
control mechanism unavoidable. Tileintricate mechanism of direct
control that replaced the previousprice system compelled thegov-
ernment to supervise internationaltransactions much more closely.
No important changes becamenecessary in the system of foreign
exchange control in all theyears after the introduction of theNew
Plan. The many small changesthat were madewere concerned with
10plugging loopholes and improving administration. The system of
control, as it is described here, is embodied in the Foreign Exchange
Control Law of December 12, I938which cifieall previous
Legislative steps, but in no way changed their basic charater.
Foreign exchange control was exercised by four differei.tRi
agencies, the Department of Economics, the Reichsbank, the F )reign
Exchange Offices, and the Supervisory Agencies. Ultimate auttority
was vested in the Department of Economics but since problems of
foreign exchange and international payments directly affect the
work of the Central Bank,8 the Department of Economics was to
work in conjunction with the Reichsbank. Foreign exchange control
was subdivided into the collection of all incoming paymentsin
foreign exchange, and the allocation of available foreign exchange
for the satisfaction of existing, or the creation of new, obligations.
All incoming payments from abroad had to be handed over to the
Reichsbank, either directly or through those commercial banks
which as agents of the Reichsbank had been designated as "foreign
exchange banks" and authorized to deal in foreign funds. To enable
the Reichsbank to check up on all payments as they fell due abroad,
exporters were forced to record the nature and value of all com-
modities shipped out of the country. Those who failed either to
declare their exports or to deliver their foreign exchange faced
severe penalties.
The allocation of foreign exchange was in the hands ofi Super-
visory Agencies and 29 Foreign Exchange Offices. After the intro-
duction of special permits for each individual import transaction,
the Supervisory Agencies were by far the more important institu-
tions. They had authority over all visible trade, deciding whether
given imports and exports were desirable and whether the quanti-
ties, prices, credit tenus, or countries involved were satisfactory.9
Organized by commodities or groups of commodities instead of geo-
graphical districts, the Supervisory Agencies were able to acquire a
tremendous amount of knowledge and information regarding their
specific branches of the economy. The work of the Supervisory
Agencies was not limited to regulating visible trade, but was even-
I Reichsgesetzblatl (1938) 1, pp. 1733. 185!.
8 Carl Herinann Muller. Crundriss der Dcvisenbewirtschaftung (1938) p. 193.
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tually extended to controlling all processes of production in all in-
dustries. Although the Foreign Exchange Offices that were affihated
with the Regional Collectors of Internal Revenue were subsidtaries
of the Department of Economics, they were headed by a Reichsbank
official. They were responsible for international trade in "services."
for the establishment of Aski-accounts,1° for all payments resulting
from in-transit trade, and for all internationalmoney and capital
movements except the standstill agreements, the year-to-year ar-
rangements with foreign creditors of short-term debts which were
handled by the Reichsbank itself.
With the passage of time, foreign exchange control,as elaborated
by those various official agencies, became increasinglycomplicated.
with far-reaching consequences for the conductof international
economic affairs. No longer were economic transactions between
Germany and the outside world dominated by theautonomous
price mechanism; they werenow determined by government agen-
cies interested in the requirements of the militaryeconomy. With
the extension of foreign exchange controlover all transactions in
the economy which might leadto a movement of funds across the
border, much of the former activity of privatebanks became sub-
ject to close government scrutiny. Dealings inforeign exchange,
foreign securities, foreign commercial bills,and foreign real estate,
direct investments in foreign countries,loans to foreigners, deposits
and withdrawals by foreigners, all these anda host of other cus-
tomary banking transactions were now carefully controlled.At the
same time, the old relationships between German and foreignbusi-
nessmen were superseded by novel arrangements improvised for
special purposes, arrangements like the standstillagreements, the
clearing agreements, the blocked marks,the Aski-accounts, etc.
The Reiehsbank
Since the Reichsbank was the heart of themoney and banking
system, and since heavy financial demandswere about to be made
upon the economy, the Nazi government considered itnecessary at
9The actual movement of goods was supervised bythe customs offices on the basis
of the permits issued by the Supervisonj Agencies.
loMki-accounts resulted from payments made by Germanirnportera for special
kinds of imports. Balances in Aski-accounts couldbe used only for purchase and





























an early date of its regime to revise the Reichsbank Act.'1 The gov-
ernment obtained full legal control over the Reichsbank by invok-
ing the "leadership principle" according to which the Reich Presi-
dent (synonymous, after August i with Reich Chancellor) was
given authority to appoint the President of the Reichsbank and the
members of the Board of Directors. Other changes were made in
order to erect a legal foundation for the huge expansion of public
credit that was soon to develop. The power of the Reichsbank to
influence the expansion and contraction of.credit was made more
effective by conferring upon it the privilege of pursuing open-
market policies, a change made "in view of the needs of the pre-
vailing new general conditions." 12 Securities thus purchased, as well
as outstanding lombard loans (loans against securities), could hence-
forth be substituted for the commercial bills that before were sub-
sidiary to gold and. foreign exchange as legal cover against note
circulation. Furthermore, the statutory reserve of40percent in gold
and foreign exchange originally required against circulating notes,
and previously temporarily suspended, was now permanently aban-
doned. This meant that while technically a gold and foreign ex-
change reserve requirement was still on the statute books, there
was no provision for any minimum percentage. These amendments
were the beginning of a development that was carried to extremes
in the next six years of Nazi rule. With foreign exchange and gold
cover practically not necessary any longer, with commercial bills,
outstanding lombard loans, and any securities that the Reichsbank
decided to buy, all acceptable as cover, with foreign exchange con-
trol preventing disequilibria in the balance of payments, any and
every increase in the circulating medium (currency and deposits)
could easily be effected.
The Reichsbank Act was again revised in 1937. A law of Febni.
ary10,193713 reestablished complete sovereignty of the Reichover
the Reichsbank,'4 and made the President and the Board of Di.
rectors of the Reichsbank immediately responsible to the Reich
11 Law Concerning the Change of the Banking Act of October 27, 1933, Rekhs
gesetzblau (1953) II, p. 827.
12 Verwaltungsbericht der Reichsbanh für das Jahr 1933 (1934) p. 8.
1$ Reichsgesetzblatt (1957) II, p. 47.
14 By a proclamation cii the Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1937. the Reichabank
was declared free of all international restrictions still in force from previous repara-
tiofi .ettlements.(Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1937, p. 446.)
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Chancellor. Since the government was already exercising what
amounted to complete power over the Reichsbank, the practical
significance of these changes was small. They exemplify, however,
the quest after formal "legality" which has characterized so many
Nazi activities.
More than two years later, a new act, the Reichsbank Act of June
15,193915brought to its logical conclusion the development that
started with the first Nazi revision in October 1933. Embodying no
major changes in the oganization and structure of the Reichsbank,
the Act codified and legalized the practices which the Reichsbank
had already established. It formally setup the Central Bank as a
part of the government apparatus enjoying a status similar to that
of other government departments, with its employees virtually be.
coming civil servants. The Reichsbank "shall be directly responsible
to the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich" said sectioni of the new
Act. The Reich Chancellorwas given legal authority to hire and fire
the President and the Directors of the Reichsbankat will, to issue
instructions, and to supervise the direction and administrationof
the bank. But most important forour purposes were the provisions
affecting the credit policy of the Reichsbank.The Act ofiq
formally abolished the requiredcover for notes in circulation, and
provided for coverage by commercial bills,Treasury bills, securi-
ties purchased in the open market by theReichsbank, and outstand-
ing lombard loans.
There were thus no legal limitswhatsoever to the powers of
credit creation of the Reichsbank. Itcould go so far as to issuecur-
rency for the purchase of commercial and Treasurybills and securi-
ties, and then treat the bills andsecurities as cover against thenotes
with which they had been bought;and there was no limitto its
doing so. Nor was thereany limit to the amount of working credit
that could be granted to the Reich,or to the amount of Treasury
bills that could be purchased."The maximumamount will be de
termined by the Führer and Chancellorof the Reich," said the Act.
As for gold and foreign exchange,their functionwas completely
changed inasmuchas they no longer acted as legalreserves. They
could still be "admittedas note cover in addition to thecover men
tioned above" and the Reichsbankwas to keep its holdings "at such
'5Reichsgesetzblait (1939) I,p. 1015.
'4
Ia level as it deemed necessary in order to settle balances with foreign
Countries and maintain the value of the currency."
Commercial Credit and Banking Institutions
Prior to the 1929 depression, the government had no authority to
supervise the commercial banks of Germany. Although some meas-
ures of control were introduced in i 931 under the pressure of the
banking emergency, comprehensive supervision was not set up until
the passage of a new law concerning the entire credit system, the
German Credit Act of December 5, 1934.The Act gave the gov-
ernment jurisdiction over all credit institutions, except those that
were owned by the government (the Reichsbank, the Gold Discount
Bank - a subsidiary of the Reichsbank - and the check account
system of the Reich Post Offices).
The Act followed a pattern which was characteristic of the Nazi
economy. It subjected the banks to complete domination of the gov-
ernment and deprived them of the economic freedom they had
previously enjoyed, but it was scrupulously careful to perpetuate
the institution of private property in banks. It provided that all
banks - except saving banks and credit institutions 'which had been
publicly owned before the advent of the Nazis - were to continue
b function as privately-owned institutions. Another aspect of the
psual Nazi legislative pattern exemplified by the Credit Act was its
deliberate generality. The Act's framework was a series of general
tules designed to guide the supervising agencies in administering
tie Act and controlling the credit system. Very few provisions were
opecific enough to curtail seriously the discretionary powers of the
governing bodies. The intent obviously was to provide powers broad
enough to meet any situation that might arise.
The authority which the government exercised over the credit
system was vested in two institutions set up for that specific pur-
pose.'7 They were the Supervisory Board for the Credit System
charged with providing general rules and principles, and the Reich
Commissioner for the Credit System, responsible fot executing the
10 Ibid. (1934) I, p. 1203. For complete translation, see Federal Reserve Bulletin
(January 1935) pp. 30 if.
17 The credit institutions were also included in a huge government-controlled
organization of all industries and were thus subject to Reich authority through yet
another mechanism.
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generaJ measures of the Supervisory Board, and enjoying privileges
and obligations of his own. The Board consisted of seven members,
the President and the Vice-President of the Reichsbank, who were
its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, the Under-Secretaries
of the Departments of the Treasury, Economics, Agriculture and In-
terior, and a member appointed by the Chancellor of the Reich.
The Reich Commissioner was one of the subsidiary agents of the
Department of Economics. Appointed by the Chancellor of the
Reich with the advice of the President of the Reichsbank, the Corn.
missioner might attend the meetings of the Board but was not en-
titled to vote. This limitation was scarcely important, since the Act
did not provide for balloting by the Board, unless a decision of the
Commissioner was being appealed. In accordance with the "leader-
ship principle," all decisions were made by the Chairman of the
Board. If a single member of the Board protested his decision, the
Chairman could be overruled by the Reich Cabinet. By appointing
the President of the Reichsbank Chairman of the Supervisory Board,
the most influential of the supervisory agencies, the Actconcen-
trated great powers in the hands of the Reichsbank. Thispower was
curtailed, however, by a decree of September15, 193918 which
abolished the Supervisory Board and transferred its functionsto the
Department of Economics. The Office of the ReichCommissioner
became the Reich Supervisory Office for the CreditSystem with a
President appointed by the Reich Chancellor after consultationwith
the President of the Reichsbank. Directly responsibleto the De-
partment of Economics, the Reich Supervisory Office exercisedcon-
trol over all credit institutions.
The Act was studded with provisions ofthe most general kind.
provisions designed to give legal standingto any and every step
taken by government agencies. Probablythe most important of these
was the section authorizing the Supervisory Boardto "issue rules for
the conduct of the business of creditinstitutions." Any provision
that is so general obviously offers,like similar blanket provisions
written into other Nazi laws,unlimited possibilities. It intendedto
legalize the huge arbitrary authoritysubsequently exercised by the
government.
Much of the Act was madeup of provisions that empowereda








rates, commissions, fees, and all other business terms were to be
fixcd by the Commissioner, with the consent of the Reichsbank. The
discarding of the existing market mechanism as interest-rate deter-
miner, and the substitution of rates set by the government, was de-
signed to increase the effectiveness of quantitative credit control
over what had been possible when the Reichsbank could change
directly only its discount and lombard rate.
The quantitative control was considered far from sufficient. In
order to supplement other direct control measures in the economy.
the government desired qualitative control over all liquid funds.
Without being precise, or referring to qualitative control by name,
the Act made ample provision for it. Each month credit institutions
were required to report to the Reich Commissioner all debtors
whose total liabilities to any individual credit institution exceeded
one million reichsmarks, a figure that was not very large. If any
single borrower had debts to more than one institution, the Reich
Commissioner was authorized to notify all of the institutions in-
volved. Under such a procedure, it is obvious that the Commis-
sioner could not only be kept up to date on information that was
important for controlling the credit policy of banking institutions,
but could insist on being consulted about the advisability of grant.
ing the larger loans before they were actually made. Another aid in
exercising qualitative control was the provision limiting the loans
of any credit institution to any individual borrower to a percent-
age of its capital, a percentage fixed by the Supervisory Board;'9
any loan exceeding that percentage was to be "reported" to the
Commissioner.
These provisions could be used by the government to make it diffi-
cult or impossible to finance new investment of any considerable mag-
nitude out of bank credit, at a time when the capital market was vir-
tually closed to new private 20 and bank credit often was
a last resort. Powerful instruments in their own right, theycould
always be buttressed by the more general provisions, such as the
article permitting the Supervisory Board to "issue rules for the con-
duct of the business of credit institutions," and the article instruct-
ing the Supervisory Board to shape money and banking policy in
'*On June 24. 1936, the Supervisory Board fixed the percentage at 10-15 percent,
depending on the size of credit institutions (Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, 1936, No 149).
















estaccordance with the general interestsof the economy. Together
they embodied grants of powerbroad enough to justify almost any
degree of qualitative control. It is notpossible to say to what extent
the Act was used to reinforce the directcontrols in the economy, to
eliminate a source of funds that mightbe used for accumulating
undesirable inventories, or to prohibit newinvestment.
The Act not only introduced regulatoryprovisions which were
sorely needed for commercial banking in Germanyand which had
been long overdue, it also abolished everyvestige of freedom of
trade for credit institutions. Thus it was possiblefor the govern-
ment to ferret out whatever information itmight require to enforce
its will. A license from the Reich Commissioner was prerequisite to
opening a new credit institution or establishing a branch office at
home or abroad. Any credit institution or any of its branches could
be closed by the Commissioner for "the violation of general inter-
ests," a provision general enough to give the authorities unlimited
power. Credit institutions had to keep the Commissioner informed
concerning various changes in their circumstance, such as changes
in management, changes in the capital structure, or a decision to
close the institution. The Commissioner could request balance
sheets, profit-and-loss accounts, and any books or documents of the
institution. He could attend shareholders' and partnership meetings
and could request that shareholders' and membership meetings be
called so that problems of one kind or another could be brought
before them. To these provisions should be added the many sec-
tions of the Act which permitted complete insight into internal
affairs and business practices of all credit institutions, and those sec-
tions that made the imposition of heavy penalties possible. Froma
superficial point of view, some of these new regulations may be
compared to similar provisions in the United States. But seen asa
deliberately planned whole and in the political and economicstruc-
ture of Nazi-Germany, they constituted a formidable barrier both
against concealment and non-cooperation in the militaryeconomy.
The other provisions of the Actwere concerned largely with the
future condition of the capital market, whichthe Nazis were pre-
paring to exploit to the utmostas an aid in financing their gigantic
military program. According toa competent authority who wrote
soon after the passage of the Act,2' the provision forgovernment

































fixed-interest rates was largely inspired by the government's interest
in future developments in the capital market. Acompetitive market
might have established higher interest rates than the government
desired. But more important in connection with the capitalmarket
were the parts of the Act specificallydesigned to make funds avail-
able for government expenditure. Such were theprovisions requir-
ing credit institutions to keep, besides a cash reserve,"secondary"
reserves in commercial bills andsecurities, and limiting their hold-
ings in equity, real estate, and permanent businessparticipations.
The Supervisory Board was to determine how large a percentage
of a bank's liabilities (except savings accounts) were tobe kept as
a secondary reserve.The percentage to be fixed by the Board could
not exceed o percent. No doubtthis provision for secondary re-
serves was primarily designed toinduce credit institutions to buy
government securities. TheSupervisory Agencies, moreover, were
in a position to exercise moral suasion. Itis reported, for example,
that the Board, acting on the basis of itsdetailed knowledge of the
balances canied by each depositorsinstructed credit institutions to
"invite customers with balances of more than,000 reichsmarks to
subscribe to government issues."
A word should be said about savingsbanks, a source of govern-
ment credit about which the Act was not veryspecific, merely dele-
gating to the Supervisory Board the power toissue instructions con-
cerning reserve requirements and investments.There is no doubt
that from the very beginning22 the governmentplanned to have
savings banks invest a large part of theirfunds, as they later did, in
government securities.
SPECIAL MEASURES AFFECTING THECAPITAL MARKET
It did not take the Nazi governmentlong to realize that its ambitious
plans required the piling up of huge governmentdeficits, much of
which would have to be financed inthe capital market. With this
in mind the government reachedinto the capital market and through
a series of legislativeand administrative steps soonaltered its func-
tion and significance. Mention hasalready been made of the Credit
22 A. Dauphin-MeUflier. 'ALe Connote desBanques en Allemagne." Revue d'&onomie
Politique (1936) p. 418.
2* Das Reichsgesctz über das Kreditwesen(previously cited) p. 68.
'9
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Act provisions designed to harness the capital market to the needs
of the military economy. We refer particularly to the provisions
making it obligatory for all credit institutions to hold a certain por-
tion of their assets in the form of commercial bills and securities,2
provisions which radically changed the pre-Nazi practice of German
commercial banks, savings banks, insurance companies, etc., of in-
vesting relatively small amounts of their funds in government se-
curities. From official statjstjcs,25 it would seem that the investment
policies of savings banks and insurance companies were immediately
affected, investments in government issues growing rapidly while
investments in mortgages, individual loans, etc., declined. The
change in the portfolios of commercial banks, particularly with re-
gard to long-term government issues, was effected much more slowly,
but the pace quickened visibly in the two years before the outbreak
of war.
The provisions of the Credit Act, however, were only a fragment
of the government's activity in the capital market. Many other steps
were taken to "increase the internal strength" of the capital market
and improve its ability to absorb government loans. Some of these,
such as the Law of June i, 1933 reducing interest rates on agricul-
tural debts, the Law of September 21, 1933 consolidating the short-
term municipal debt, and the various decrees extending the mora-
torium on mortgages and other debts,were primarily concerned
with the creditor-debtor relation. Other steps, such as the various
conversion laws, were adopted in order to lower interest rates that
might otherwise have tempted capital away from government issues,
or increased the government's cost of borrowing. Many of these, as
well as relevant changes in tax legislation, are described later. Here,
two other measures will be treated. One of them was concerned
primarily with the stock market and probably affected the capital
market only indirectly. The other representeda major effort by the
Nazis to link the capital market directly to their militaryprogram.
Before the Nazi victory in 1933 the stock market had beena
U Although this provision made no specific referenceto government securities, it
was used to increase the amount of government paper held by credit institutions.
55 Reichs-Iredit-Gesellschaft, &onomic Conditions in Germanyin the Middle oj
the Year 1939, pp. 52-53.
UReichsgesazbla:t (1933) 1,pp. 331, 647. 1092; (1934) I, p. 1255; and (1935) 1,
p. 1467.
20favorite target of Nazi propagandists. But once they were in control.
they contented themselves with minor organLnional changes, such
as reducing the number of stock exchanges from twenty-one tonine.
Due to the improvement in general business conditions, and pos-
sibly to the fears of investors that inflationary movements might de-
velop, stock market prices had been rising steadily since early in
i g. From ito ithe average of stock prices rose approxi-
mately 15 percent; from 1934 to 1935k approximately 17 percent.
Dividends on stocks were increasing at the same time as the yield
on long-term bonds was declining. Claiming that it feared apossible
diversion of funds into the stock market, the government in Decem-
ber 1934 added to its public warnings against speculative tendencies
and to its pressure upon the banks to discourage undesirable stock
market practices, the law concerning the distribution of profits by
corporations.ss
This law made it illegal for corporations with a capital of over
ioo,000 reichsmarks to distribute, in cash, dividends exceeding 6
percent (in some cases 8 percent) of the par value of the stock. The
difference between the permissible cash dividends and the declared
dividend (if it was higher than permissible) was to be paid to the
Gold Discount Bank, which was instructed to invest this in govern.
inent bonds to the account of the shareholders of the corporation.
After three years, when the law expired (at the end of 1937) the
funds accumulated in the Gold Discount Bank were to be distributed
to the shareholders in either cash or securities. But in December
1937 the law was extended for another three years,and it was de-
cided to distribute the funds of the first three years in tax certificates
acceptable in payment of many Federal taxes to be levied between
1941 arid ig.. Finally, in June 1941, the law was again modified.3°
This time, any new increase in dividends was prohibited unless a
corporation had paid less than 6 percent before the issuance of the
decree. Dividends of all corporations in excess of 6 percent were sub-
ject to a sharply graduated tax, heavy enough to make dividends in
27 Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturjorschung, Vol. 9. No. 3. Part B. p. 284; and
Vol. 11, No. 4, Part B, p. 112.
2$ Rekhsgeselzblatt (1934) 1. P. 1222.
29 Ibid. (1937)!. p. 1340.
$0 Ibid. (1941)1. pp. 323,493.
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excess of 6 percent virtuallyimpossible.31 The portion of the de-
clared dividend which exceeded 6 percent (in some cases8 percent)
and could not be paid out in cash was no longer to beturned over
to the Gold Discount Bank, but to beinvested by the corporation in
government securities and held in trust forthe shareholders.32
It has often been claimed that the law, in keeping with principles
frequently proclaimed by the Nazi party, genuinely sought a reduc-
tion in dividends, or that its major concern was the amassing of
large quantities of funds for the purchase of government bonds.
Neither claim stands up under careful scrutiny. In the first place,
corporations could legally escape the provisions of the laws of 1934
and t 937 by increasing the par value of their shares. The par value
of any share could be so increased that any absolute dividend pay-
ment would amount to a yield of not more than 6 or 8 percent of
the par value. A good many corporations made use of this device
until it was modified in the 1941 amendment. After the 1941 amend-
ment, a corporation could no longer escape the maximum provision
of the law by changing the par value of shares. But the decree ex-
pressly made it possible for corporations to escape the new heavy
tax on dividends in excess of 6 percent by modifying their capital
structure. As a matter of fact, the government did everything in its
power to encourage such reorganizations of corporations.33 Several
hundred corporations "rectified" their capital structure within six
months after the release of the decree,34 which meant that they
escaped the penalty tax in paying dividends in excess of 6 percent.
Second, it is clear that shareholders were not permanently de-
prived of the increased earnings of their companies. They were
merely compelled to wait a few years before cashing in on them.
3111 a corporation paid a dividend of 7 percent, it was to pay an additional %
percent of the par value of the share as tax; with an 8 percent dividend a tax of 2
percent; with a 9 percent dividend a tax of 73 percent; and with a 10 percent divi-
dend a tax of 12 percent was to be paid. This meant that if a corporation wanted to
distribute a dividend of 10 percent - of which 2 or 4 percent was to be invested in
government securities - it actually had to pay out 22 percent.
32 For a detailed discussion of the June 1941 decree, see Foreign Commerce Weekly
(August 16, 1941) pp. 6 and 19; and Friedrich Sarow, "Dividendenbegrenzung und
Kapitalsausgleich." Die WirtschafLskun'e, Vol. 20 (1941)1,p. 187.
33 Heinrich Strathus, "I)as neue Dividendenbild," Die DeutscheYolkswirfschaft
(1941) p. 675.
34 IVirtschaftsdienst (1942) p. 33.
22Third, corporations could avoid contributing to the purchase of
government bonds by the simple expedient of keeping their divi-
dends within the limits of the law. The resulting accumulation of
undistributed profits would have enabled them to finance expansion
of capacity out of their own funds, an effect that the government
ardently desired. Since, as will be explained below, the government
was determined to reserve the capital market for itself, it hoped to
decrease the demand by corporations for outside funds by encour-
aging them to retain their earnings.
There can be no doubt that the law had little direct effect upon
the government bond market. The total sum paid into the Gold
Discount Bank under the law amounted to103million reichsmarks
for the period of the first Act until the end of ig, and to io8 mil-
lion reichsmarks for the second period, until the middle of1941
both very insignificant amounts. Any important effects that the law
may have had must have been indirect. By inducing some corpora-
tions to accumulate more funds than they otherwise would, it may
have reduced the pressure on the capital market and reduced some-
what the purchasing power in the hands of shareholders. If, in addi-
tion, we consider the fact that not every corporation evaded the law,
it becomes apparent that the law placed a damper on the price of
stocks insofar as shareholders of non-evading corporations realized
that they could not cash in on their earnings for some time to come,
and insofar as the dividends of such corporations were kept below
what their earnings would ordinarily have warranted. Average stock
prices increased about 10 percent from1935to i936and about the
same percentage from1936to i97. After 1937 stock prices declined
until the outbreak of war by about 10 percent.36
Finally, by curtailing speculation in stocks with a stable par value
and by hiding speculation in stocks with par values that were changed
behind a facade of comparatively stable stock prices, the law prob-
ably prevented any large-scale movement into the stock market by
the general public; the public might otherwise have been tempted
by continually rising stock quotations to withdraw funds from tile
35 Martin Lolunann,Die Dividendenabgabeverordnung im Rahmen der Kriegs.
wirtschaftspolitik." Jahrbllcher für Nationalökonomic und Statistik (1942) p. 64.
35 Statistik des in- und Awtandes, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 38.
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bond market for the purchase of stocks.87 After the outbreak ofwar,
however, indirect measures were no longer able to forestalla boom
in the stock market. Powerful forces led to it- the increasing
liquidity in the economy, the optimism generated by militarysuc-
cesses, the growing difficulty of finding outlets for the purchasing
power in the hands of the public, the favorable business conditions,
etc. In about two years, from the beginning of the war until the
fall of i941, average stock prices rose by about 50 perCent.
It was then that the government stepped in and destroyed the
last relatively free market in the economy.38 Loans for the purchase
of stocks were prohibited. Shareholders had to filea declaration with
the government of all shares purchased since the outbreak ofwar
if their market value exceeded100,000 reichsmarks. The govern-
ment could, at any time, request that any of these shares be de-
livered to it for cash and that the proceeds be invested in securities
to be specified by the government. In the summer of 1942, thegov-
ernment started to make use of that authority. It was hoped that the
possibility of forced sales would discourage speculators andthat the
government could accumulate a pool of securities to be thrownon
the market whenever the market price of such securitiestended to
move upward. Although prices were not kept stable, the rising
tendency seems to have been checked somewhat.Average stock
prices at the end of 1942were about 5 percent higher than a year
before.39
Long before the passage of the law concerningthe distribution of
profits, the Nazi government had takena more important step cal-
culated to affect the capital market directly.It had drastically lim-
ited the flotation of new private capitalissues, a move made in an-
ticipation of subsequent developmentsin the economy. Duringthe
next two years the improved prospects fornew investment and the
decline of long-term interestrates prompted private entrepreneurs
to seek new funds. The consolidation of short-termdebts, and the
37 Another measure, which may haveslightly favored the bond marketat the
expense of the stock market, was the provision affectingstock market transactions
of foreigners. They could use any blockedbalances for the purchase of bonds but in
purchasing stocks were restricted to blockedbalances that had theirsource in a
stock transaction (Friedrich Muller, 'R.eichsbankund Kapitalmarkt," Schriftenrejhe
der Slaat.cbank, Vol. I,p. 132).
38 Wochenberichi des Deulschen luslilugsfür WirtschaJt.sforschung (1942)p. 37.
39 WirLcchaft und Stafislik (1943)p. 106.
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.reduction of the interest burden of states,municipalities and othei
debtors placed some of them in a position toincrease their borrow-
ing. It was essential, therefore, that as many ofthem as possible be
denied access to the capital market, not onlybecause the govern-
ment needed all available long-termfunds for its own military pur-
poses, but also because theinability of private enterprise to obtain
capital for new investment would stimulate its effortsfor self-financ-
ing.4°
To limit the flotation of private issues, aspecial committee was
appointed which was to examine each prospectivecapital issue on
its own merits.41 This committee, established byadministrative ac-
tion on May 31, 1933, with the President ofthe Reichsbank as chair-
man, was granted "completeauthority on its own to decide upon
and supervise all matters pertaining to themoney-and-capital mar-
ket lest disturbances of the money-and-capitalmarket occur because
of decisions or interferences by agencies withoutauthority."42 There
is little information on the actual activities ofthe committee. From
the little there is, it seems unlikely that itexercised the sweeping
authority suggested by the vague language of theofficial statement
just quoted. The committee was there to protectthe capital market
from demands that might disturb the financialpolicies of the gov-
ernment.
Since technical responsibility for granting permission tofloat new
securities rested with the Department of Economics,the functions
of the committee must have revolved aboutthe making of recom-
mendations to this Department. During the first few yearsof Nazi
rule the number and size of private issues wasexceedingly small.45
Beginning with I,936 there was a sharp increase,the committee
having ruled that financial requirements ofvarious industries under
40 The government seems to have been successful in that attempt.It is reported
that the amount taken for depredation increased considerablyin these years and that
the percentage of total profits paid out for dividends declined.While according to an
estimate by the Reich Statistical 016cc. total dividends ofall corporations were almost
as large as their depreciations in 1927,they declined to little more thanin 1938 (Die
Deutsche Volkswirt-schaft, 1941, pp. 840-41).
41 Friedrich MUller, op. ci:., p. 131.
42 Wochenbericht des Instiluts für Konjunkturforschung(March 23. 1938) p. 95.
43 The Institute for Business Cycle Research publishedinteresting information in
this respect. It compared the period 1926 to 1929 withthe period 1932 to 1936. The
relationship between new public and private issues duringthe first period was .55






































the Four Year Plan could be satisfied in the capital market. In the
six ycars from through 1938, over 17 billion reichsmarks of
new loans were floated in the capital market, of which 2.5 billion
reichsmarks or about 15 percent were private issues. Of these private
issues, 1.5 billion or 6o percent were offered in 1937 and 1g38.
Applications were approved for a few selected purposes, several is.
sues for individual states, some mortgage bonds, and some industrial
loans, necessary for financing certain projects under the Four Year
Plan. Since the projects under the Four Year Plan were undertaken
at the behest of the government, for military purposes, the use of
the capital market to finance them is actually an example of the
reservation of the capital market for government use.45
Various indications exist that after the outbreak of war, thegov-
ernment permitted even more private issues to be floated in the
capital market. With the progress of the war, therewas a growing
need on the part of private firms to resort to the capitalmarket to
finance their new investment, and at thesame time their ability
for self-financing declined because of higher corporationtaxes,
sharper price control, regulation of profits, etc.46 The totalamount
of private issues floated in the capital marketwas estimated officially
at just over 6 billion reiclismarks for the period1933 to the be-
ginning of 1942.If this be compared with the previouslymen-
tioned estimate for 1933 to 1938, it wouldseem that almost 4 billion
reichsmarks of private issueswere offered to the public in the three
years i 1940, and 1941.
44 Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft,op. cit., p. 52.
45 To round out the picture mention mightbe made of a measure that playedan
auxiliary role in reserving the capital marketfor government use. A provision of the
Law of September 21, 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt,1933, p. 647) forbidding municipalities
to incur any short-term debts for twoyears after the passage of the Law appears to
have been designed for their own protection.But this restriction was eventually
extended to become part of the general planto reserve the capital market. Thus a
decree of May 5, 1936 (ibid., 1936,p. 435) kept savings banks and giro banks from
making loans to municipalities, andprovided that thereafter, current budgetsof
municipalities include reserves for debtamortization, lest they find themselves without
funds when loans mature, and be compelledto resort to the capital market.
46 Die Deutsche J'olksvivtscliaft(1942) pp. 9-10.
47 Emil PuhI, "Grundfragen derDeutschen WShrungspolitik," DecDeutsche Volkswiyt (1942) p. IMO.
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